FREE ESSAY ON SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA

Sherman's March to the Sea
George M. Hovsepian
December 14, 1998
Sherman's March to the Sea
On November 15th, 1864 Major-General William Tecumseh Sherman, commander of the Grand
Army of the West, embarked on a raid which would become known as the march to the sea
designed to cut a 60 mile wide swath from Atlanta to Savannah. Once in Savannah he would
turn north through South and North Carolina and on into Virginia to help Grant defeat Lee
at Richmond. As Sherman's soldiers were leaving Atlanta, now in flames, they went forward
with the intent of shortening the Civil War. Sherman's troops accomplished this with a
brand of warfare seen only sporadically in the previous four years of battle. Sherman
decided to turn his attention on destroying the "enemy's war economy" (Oates, 1998,
p.594), going after the infrastructure of the South. Along the way his troops burned,
pillaged, stole personal belongings, and confiscate possessions and property of the
civilian population. Did the end justify the means and was this a just course of action?
By November 1864, the Civil War had seen gruesome days to be sure. By the end of the war
the total number of soldiers killed in combat and by disease and other non-combat related
causes for both the North and South were 623, 026 (Foote, 1974). The total wounded for
both sides were 471,427 (Foote, 1974). These numbers are staggering in that only
2,750,000 soldiers participated in the war. The battles of Manassas, Fredericksburg,
Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Antietem to name a few, were some of the most bloody of
the war. The Union Army had changed commanders many times, among them Meade, Hooker,
McClellan twice, Burnside, and Grant. Ulysses S. Grant was there to stay. Grant's best
subordinate officer was General Sherman. 
Sherman had taken command of the Western Theater and pushed Joseph Johnston off Lookout
Mountain outside of Chattanooga, then maneuvered him out of position after position until
Johnston fell back upon Atlanta, where Joe Johnston was relieved and the firebrand John
Bell Hood took command. This was significant because Hood's aggressiveness, it was feared
by his troops, would surely get them killed (Carter, 1976). They were not very wrong.
Hood attacked Sherman almost immediately, launching several failed attacks intended to
push Sherman away from Atlanta. They all failed and weakened Hood's army so severely he
had to give up Atlanta and allow Sherman many options on what to do next.
Sherman's intent was to tear through the heart of Georgia wrecking the infrastructure of
the state. Sherman's orders upon leaving Atlanta were "that nothing be left intact that
might be of use to the rebs when they returned" (Foote, 1974, p. 641). Sherman's orders
for the march were similar, though he instructed his troops not to enter civilian
dwellings or commit any trespass (Foote, 1974). Sherman did order his men to "forage
liberally" (Oates, 1998) in organized details. Sherman wanted to bring the war to a
region of the South previously untouched, middle Georgia.
The tactic of foraging has certainly been used throughout history. Sun Tzu wrote essays
about the art of war around 500 BC and even that far back the concept he proposed was
"the wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy" (Griffith, 1971, p. 74).
When discussing doctrinal stability, Archer Jones writes "the Union's logistic strategy
never had a chance to demonstrate its effectiveness" (1987, p. 417) because what
ultimately shortened the war was Southern troops deserting their units. This may have
been a lesser factor, but was likely brought about due to raids like Sherman's that
showed the true vulnerability of the South. 
The destruction of the South's infrastructure such as rail lines, bridges, warehouses,
and material that could be used to support military operations, is another principle
which is a common occurrence in war. In Atlanta, the Mayor "begged Sherman to rescind his
order expelling the citizens from the city" (Groom, 1995, p.112) which Sherman refused to
do because he was about to fire the town. While his intention was not to disturb civilian
homes on the march, he would in fact authorize the burning of homes if it was found that
owners had willfully destroyed crops or other things which the Union army could use. With
that little bit of latitude, some Union soldiers would in fact loot and pillage for their
own gain. Later, in Sherman's after action report, he shrugged off what happened by
saying that some of his men "did some things they ought not to have done" (Groom, 1995,
p.113).
One of the most tragic events of the war involving non-combatants occurred during the
march to the sea. With just tens of miles to go before Sherman's troops reached Savannah,
they had at their rear 25,000 blacks who had left their plantations and were determined
to follow Sherman to freedom (Foote, 1974). Oates quotes Sherman as saying "I also told
the army not to take any nigger refugees. Grant had urged me to 'clean the country of
Negroes,' but I wasn't going to do that: would just slow us down. Only niggers I wanted
were able bodied men to work as army laborers" (1998, p. 590). Sherman and his generals
had admonished the Negroes to go home, that the war would soon be over and they would be
free but to little avail. Even though many of these had turned back from exhaustion and
fatigue, there were still a considerable number of blacks, women and children included,
when Sherman's column was crossing Ebenezer Creek. The creek was unfordable and a span
was put in place by Sherman's engineers. After Sherman's troops finished crossing, he
ordered the span removed and left all of the blacks on the other side.
With Confederate horsemen closing on their position, the Negroes surged forward and then
stampeded into the creek, determined not to be left behind by their deliverers who they
thought would lead them out of bondage (Foote, 1974). Many of those drowned to the horror
of the engineers standing on the far bank. Seeing the disaster that their actions had
brought on, the engineers waded into the icy creek to save who they could. To be
accurate, it is important to note that Sherman did not know of this incident until much
later and made no specific order to rid himself of the blacks who he saw as a burden. He
did however, make it crystal clear through comments to his subordinates and directly to
black ministers that he did not want them anywhere around his soldiers. The blacks did
not heed the advice or the warnings.
Sherman was deemed a brilliant, innovative and astute commander (Jones, 1987) by the end
of the war. Even though he fell from grace early in the war, his beliefs and approach in
time proved extremely accurate. Sherman was in fact very outspoken. He said "in
war,...everything is right which prevents anything. If bridges are burned, I've got a
right to burn all the houses near it, and Goddamn it, I mean to do it, too" (Oates, 1998,
p. 598). Sherman firmly believed in fighting an extreme brand of war. He wanted to make
the experience so painful that no one involved would ever have the desire to do so in the
future. This actually is a very commendable and noble goal. Even though Sherman was
fiery, outspoken, and justifying his actions with his own beliefs, they were not
necessarily wrong or unjust.
The march to the sea produced some events which in a different place or time would most
definitely be judged differently. Taken individually, even his remarks would get him
removed from office had he lived in our era. Sherman said "I didn't agree with Grant or
the Administration that niggers could make good soldiers..." (Oates, 1998, p. 572).
Regarding the burning of Atlanta, "...the South made a big howl...but I would have been a
Goddamned fool to take a town at such cost and leave it occupied by a hostile people. If
Jeff Davis and Hood didn't like it, *censored* 'em" (Oates, 1998, p.573). Clearly Sherman
liked the idea of tough ideas and tough action, but it is important to remember that
neither he or his troops condoned crimes against a person such as murder or rape. The
harshness with which he fought was motivated by a pure desire to end the war and leave
such a distaste for it that no one would be in a hurry to have another.
Did the end justify the means? Sherman had other options when he was in Atlanta. The
option that President Lincoln and general Grant wanted him to take was to pursue General
Hood and destroy his army. Even though Hood was defeated at Atlanta as Robert E. Lee had
privately predicted (Long, 1983), he still had a considerable and very mobile force with
which to fight. Sherman knew how costly and futile a pursuit would be. He knew he would
have to garrison, Atlanta, guard the railroads, and chase Hood. "That Goddamned Hood was
afraid to fight me on open ground and therefore moved around and north of Atlanta..."
(Oates, 1998, p.577). Sherman knew that Hood was not burdened with many supplies or bags,
and Hood already had a days march on him. He would be very hard indeed to catch.
The cost in men and morale was also a factor. Trying to pursue Hood would mean marching
into ambushes, fighting battles on ground of Hood's choosing, and generally lowering the
number and morale of Sherman's soldiers. Chasing Confederate soldiers had proven
extremely difficult throughout the war and there was no reason to think that Hood would
be any different. With Hood moving north and west, Sherman would be pulled away from
where he felt he could end the war sooner with fewer casualties, the South. 
When all is taken into account, the brutal battles, the staggering casualties, families
divided against each other, the monumental devastation of resources, can anyone point a
finger and say that what Sherman did by conducting a campaign against a hostile country
was wrong or unjust. Only those who have been in that situation can really know what
justice means. Did Sherman break civilian and military law? He probably did. It is too
easy to look at each individual act in a wartime situation. An example of this would be
when Sherman was within nine miles of Savannah he came upon a group of men standing
around an officer whose leg had been blown to pieces by a mine, or torpedo as it was
called in that day. As they were waiting for a doctor, another officer stepped on a mine
and wounded him and several others. "The *censored*ing cowards had planted eight inch
shells in the road...this wasn't war, it was Goddamned murder" (Oates, 1998, p.604).
Enraged, he made a group of Confederate prisoners use picks and shovels to uncover the
rest of the mines in the road, even though they insisted that they had no idea that they
were even there. Sherman said "I don't give a damn if you're blown up. I'll not have my
own men killed like this" (Oates, 1998, p. 604). This act is, in military justice,
illegal. If that were to happen today, Sherman had a 50/50 chance of being charged.
Morally, he was and would be hailed by his troops.
Having been in a wartime situation myself, I understand that the issue of whether
something is just differs between peacetime and wartime, region to region, and era to
era. The core moral laws, however, don't change. To cold bloodedly murder a civilian,
rape, and torture of a civilian would clearly be immoral in any arena. Sherman did nor
condoned any of this. Sherman had compassion for his enemy but was ruthless in dealing
with them, much like general George S. Patton was in World War II. Both Patton and
Sherman are considered to be among the greatest generals this country has ever produced.
In my opinion Sherman's plan, execution, and intent were just. The end most certainly
justified the means. The march to the sea was a crushing blow to the resources of the
South, isolated all regions of the Confederacy by destroying the rail hub in Atlanta, and
permanently reducing the South's morale and desire to fight. 
Bibliography
References
Carter, S. (1976). The siege of Atlanta, 1864. New York: Ballantine Books.
Foote, S. (1974). The Civil War, a narrative (Vol 2). New York: Random House Publishers.
Griffith, S. (Ed.). (1971). Sun Tzu the art of war. New York: Oxford University Press.
Groom, W. (1995). Shrouds of glory: The last great campaign of the Civil War. New York:
The Atlantic Monthly Press.
Jones, A. (1987). The art of war in the western world. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Long, A.L.. (1983). Memoirs of Robert E. Lee. Secaucus: The Blue and Grey Press.
Oates, S. (1998). The whirlwind of war: Voices of the storm 1861-1865. New York: Harpers
Collins Publishers.