FREE ESSAY ON ETHICAL EGOISM

ETHICAL EGOISM

In ethics egoism entails that the individual self is either the motivating moral force and
is, or should, be the end of moral action. 
Egoism divides into both a positive and normative ethic. The positive ethic views egoism
as a factual description of human affairs, that is people are motivated by their own
interests and desires. The normative ethic is that they should be so motivated.
Positivist egoism: Psychological Egoism
The positivist egoist, whose theory is called psychological egoism, offers an explanation
of human affairs, in effect a description of human nature, which he or she believes to be
wholly self-centred and self-motivated. In its strong form the theory asserts that people
always act in their own interests, even though they may disguise their motivation with
references to helping others or doing their duty. 
Opponents exploit counter-factual evidence to criticize the theory-surely, they claim,
there is a host of evidence supporting altruistic or duty-bound actions that cannot be
said to engage the self-interest of the agent? Psychological egoists may then attempt to
question the ultimate motive of acting benevolently towards others; they may retort that
seemingly altruistic behavior necessarily has a self-interested component, that if the
individual were not to offer aid to a stranger, he or she may feel guilty or may look bad
in front of a peer group. At this point psychological egoism's validity turns on the
question of moral motivation. But since motivation is inherently private (an agent could
be lying to him or herself or to others about the original motive), the theory shifts
from a theoretical description of human nature, one that can be put to observational
testing, to an assumption about human nature. It moves beyond the possibility of
empirical verification and the possibility of empirical negation (since motives are
private), and therefore it becomes a closed theory. A closed theory is a theory that
rejects competing theories on its own terms and is non-verifiable and non-falsifiable. If
psychological egoism is reduced to an assumption concerning human nature, then it follows
that it is just as valid to hold a competing theory of human motivation, psychological
altruism for example. Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily
other centred and other motivated. A parallel analysis of psychological altruism results
in opposing conclusions to psychological egoism, and again arguably the theory is just as
closed as psychological egoism. If both theories can be validly maintained, it follows
that the soundness of either or both must be questioned.
A weak version of psychological egoism accepts the possibility of altruistic or
benevolent behavior, but maintains that whenever a choice is made it is by definition the
action that the agent wants to do at that point. A wants to help the poor, therefore A is
acting egoistically; if A ran into a burning building to save a kitten, it must be the
case that A wanted to save the kitten. Defining all motivations as what the agent wants
to do remains problematic: logically the theory becomes tautologous and therefore empty
of providing a useful, descriptive meaning of motivation. It says that we are motivated
to do what we are motivated to do. Besides which, if helping others is what A wants to
do, then to what extent can A be continued to be called an egoist?
David Hume in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Appendix II-Of Self Love)
offers six rebuttals of psychological egoism (the 'selfish hypothesis'). Firstly, it
opposes such obvious moral sentiments that engage in a concern and motivation for others
such as love, friendship, compassion, and gratitude. Secondly, psychological egoism
attempts to reduce human motivation to a single cause, which is a 'fruitless' task-the
love of simplicity...has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy. Thirdly,
it is evident that animals act benevolently towards one another, and if it is admitted
that animals can act altruistically then how can it be denied in humans? Fourthly, the
concepts we use to describe benevolent behavior cannot be meaningless; sometimes the
agent obviously does not have a personal interest in the fortune of another, yet will
wish him well. Any attempt to create an imaginary interest, as the psychological egoist
attempts, will prove futile. Fifthly, Hume asserts that we have prior motivations to
self-interest; we may have, for example, a predisposition towards vanity, fame, or
vengeance that transcends any benefit to the agent. Finally, even if psychological egoism
were true, there are a sufficient number of dispositions to generate a wide possibility
of moral actions, allowing one person to be called vicious and another humane, and the
latter is to be preferred over the former.
Normative Egoism: Ethical Egoism
Ethical egoism is the theory that the promotion of one's own good is in accordance with
morality. In the strong version it is held that it is always moral to promote one's own
good and it is never moral not to promote it. In the weak version, it claims that whilst
it is always moral to promote one's good, it is not necessarily never moral not to do
so-that is, there may be conditions in which the avoidance of personal interest may be a
moral action.
In the imaginary construction of a world inhabited by a single being, it is possible that
the pursuit of morality is the same as the pursuit of self-interest. What is good for the
agent is the same as what is in the agent's interests. Arguably, there could never arise
an occasion when the agent ought not to pursue self-interest in favor of another
morality. Whilst it is possible for the creature to lament previous choices as not
conducive to self-interest (enjoying the pleasures of swimming all day and not spending
necessary time producing food), the mistake is not a moral mistake but a mistake of
identifying self-interest. Presumably this lonely creature will begin to comprehend the
distinctions between short and long run interests. However, it can be countered that in
this world duties still apply; (Kantian) duties are those actions reason dictates ought
to be pursued regardless of any gain or loss to the self or others. The deontologist
asserts another moral sphere, namely impartial duties, which ought to be pursued. The
problem with complicating the creature's world with duties, is defining an impartial task
in a purely subjective world. Impartiality, it can be retorted, can only exist where
there are competing selves, otherwise the attempt to be impartial in judging one's
actions is a redundant exercise.
If we move away from the imaginary construct of a single being's world, ethical egoism
comes under fire from more pertinent arguments. In complying with ethical egoism, the
individual aims at his or her own greatest good. Ignoring a definition of the good for
the present, it may justly be argued that pursuing one's own greatest good can conflict
with another's pursuit, thus creating a situation of conflict. In a typical example, a
young person may see his greatest good in murdering his rich uncle to inherit his
millions. It is the rich uncle's greatest good to continue enjoying his money, as he sees
fit. Accordingly conflict is an inherent problem of ethical egoism, and the model
seemingly does not possess a conflict resolution system. With the additional premise of
living in society, ethical egoism has much to respond to. Obviously there are situations
when two people's greatest goods, their own self-interests, will conflict, and a solution
to such dilemmas is a necessary element of any theory attempting to provide an ethical
system. 
The first resolution proceeds from a state of nature examination. If, in the wilderness,
two people simultaneously come across the only source of drinkable water a dilemma arises
if both make a claim to it. With no recourse to arbitration they must either accept an
equal share of the water, which would comply with rational egoism (i.e., it is in the
interests of both to share, for both may enjoy the water and each other's company, and if
the water is inexhaustible, neither can gain from monopolising the source), but a critic
can maintain that it is not necessarily in compliance with ethical egoism. Arguably, the
critic continues, the two have no possible resolution and must therefore fight for the
water. This is often the line taken against egoism, that it results in insoluble conflict
that implies or necessitates a resort to force. The proffered resolution is therefore an
acceptance of the might is right principle, that the stronger will take possession and
thereby gains proprietary rights. But ethical egoism does not have to logically result in
a Darwinian struggle between the strong and the weak; the two could co-operate (as
rational egoism would require) and thereby both could mutually benefit. Against the
critic's pessimism, the ethical egoist can retort that each can recognize that their
greatest interests are served more through co-operation than conflict.
A second resolution to seemingly intractably moral dilemmas concerns the fears of critics
that ethical egoists could logically pursue their interests at the cost of others. This
however is a misreading of ethical egoism and an attempt to re-insert the might is right
premise and thereby chastise the theory on the basis of a straw-man argument. In the case
of the rich uncle and the greedy nephew, it is not the case that the nephew would act
ethically by killing his uncle. The confusion results from conflating ethics with
personal gain and criticising personal gain from another ethical standpoint that condemns
murder. A counter-argument is that personal gain logically cannot be in one's best
interests if it entails doing harm to another: doing harm to another is to accept the
principle of doing harm to others as being ethical (i.e., equating to one's own best
interests), whereas reflection on the principle shows it to be illogical on universalist
criteria. If the nephew were to attempt to do harm to further his interests, he would
find that his uncle, or others, would do harm in return, and the argument returns to the
conclusion of the first resolution: either accept the principle of might is right (which
in most cases would be evidentially contrary to one's best interests) or accept that
co-operation with others is a more successful approach to improving one's interests. 
A third resolution entails the insertion of another standard-rights. This incorporates
the conclusions of the first two resolutions by stating that there is an ethical
framework that can logically be extrapolated from ethical egoism. Rights incorporate
boundaries to behavior that reason or experience has shown to be contrary to the pursuit
of self-interest. However, the logical extrapolation is the difficult bit. Whilst it is
facile to argue that the greedy nephew does not have a right to claim his uncle's money,
because it is not his but his uncle's, and that it is wrong to aggress against the person
of another because that person has a legitimate right to live in peace (thus providing
the substance of conflict-resolution for ethical egoism), the problem lies in the
intellectual arguments required to substantiate the claims for the existence of rights
and that they are somehow intricately connected to the pursuit of individual's greatest
good.