FREE ESSAY ON BAY OF PIGS

BAY OF PIGS

The Bay of Pigs Invasion
The story of the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs is one of mismanagement,
overconfidence, and lack of security. The blame for the failure of the operation falls
directly in the lap of the Central Intelligence Agency and a young president and his
advisors. The fall out from the invasion caused a rise in tension between the two great
superpowers and ironically 34 years after the event, the person that the invasion meant
to topple, Fidel Castro, is still in power. To understand the origins of the invasion and
its ramifications for the future it is first necessary to look at the invasion and its
origins.
The Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961, started a few days before on April 15th with the
bombing of Cuba by what appeared to be defecting Cuban air force pilots. At 6 a.m. in the
morning of that Saturday, three Cuban military bases were bombed by B-26 bombers. Seven
people were killed at Libertad and forty-seven people were killed at other sites on the
island. Two of the B-26s left Cuba and flew to Miami, apparently to defect to the United
States. 
In the early hours of April 17th the assault on the Bay of Pigs began. In the true cloak
and dagger spirit of a movie, the assault began at 2 a.m. with a team of frogmen going
ashore with
orders to set up landing lights to indicate to the main assault force the precise
location of their objectives, as well as to clear the area of anything that may impede
the main landing teams to be added when they arrived. At 2:30 a.m. and at 3:00 a.m. two
battalions came ashore at Playa Gir?n and one battalion at Playa Larga beaches. The
troops at Playa Gir?n had orders to move west, northwest, up the coast and meet with the
troops at Playa Larga in the middle of the bay. A small group of men were then to be sent
north to the town of Jaguey Grande to secure it as well.
When looking at a modern map of Cuba it is obvious that the troops would have problems in
the area that was chosen for them to land at. The area around the Bay of Pigs is a swampy
marsh land area which would be hard on the troops. The Cuban forces were quick to react
and Castro ordered his T-33 trainer jets, two Sea Furies, and two B-26s into the air to
stop the invading forces. Off the coast was the command and control ship and another
vessel carrying supplies for the invading forces. The Cuban air force made quick work of
the supply ships. With some of the invading forces' ships destroyed, and no command and
control ship, the logistics of the operation soon broke down as the other supply ships
were kept at bay by Casto's air force. As with many failed military adventures, one of
the problems with this one was with supplying the troops.
In the air, Castro had easily won superiority over the invading force. His fast moving
T-33s, although unimpressive by today's standards, made short work of the slow moving
B-26s of the invading force. On Tuesday, two were shot out of the sky and by Wednesday
the invaders had lost 10 of their 12 aircraft. With air power firmly in control of
Castro's forces, the end was near
for the invading army.
Over the 72 hours the invading force of about 1500 men were
pounded by the Cubans. Casto fired 122mm. Howitzers, 22mm. cannon, and tank fire at them.
By Wednesday the invaders were pushed back to their landing zone. Surrounded by Castro's
forces some began to surrender while others fled into the hills. In total 114 men were
killed in the slaughter while thirty-six died as prisoners in Cuban cells. Others were to
live out twenty years or more in those cells as men plotting to topple the government of
Castro.
The 1500 men of the invading force never had a chance for success from almost the first
days in the planning stage of the operation. Operation Pluto, as it came to be known as,
has its
origins in the last dying days of the Eisenhower administration and that murky time
period during the transition of power to the newly elected president John F. Kennedy.
In the spring of 1960, President Eisenhower approved a plan to send small groups of
American trained, Cuban exiles, to work in the underground as guerrillas to overthrow
Castro. By the fall, the plan was changed to a full invasion with air support by exile
Cubans in American supplied planes. The original group was to be trained in Panama, but
with the growth of the operation and the quickening pace of events in Cuba, it was
decided to move things to a base in Guatemala. The plan was becoming rushed and this
would start to show, the man in charge of the operation, CIA Deputy Director Bissell.
It was now fall and a new president had been elected. President Kennedy could have
stopped the invasion if he wanted to, but he probably didn't do so for several reasons.
Firstly, he had campaigned for some form of action against Cuba and it was also the
height of the cold war, to back out now would mean having groups of Cuban exiles
travelling around the globe saying how the Americans had backed down on the Cuba issue.
In competition with the Soviet Union, backing out would make the Americans look like
wimps on the international scene, and for domestic consumption the new president would be
seen as backing away from one of his campaign promises. The second reason Kennedy
probably didn't abort the operation is the main reason why the operation failed, problems
with the CIA.
In charge of the operation was the Director of Central Intelligence, Allan Dulles and
main responsibility for the operation was left to one of his deputies, Richard Bissell.
In an intelligence community geared mainly for European operations against the USSR, both
men were lacking in experience in Latin American affairs. In addition, after the
overthrow of the government in Guatemala, Castro was aware that this may happen to him as
well and probably had his guard up waiting for anything that my indicate that an invasion
was imminent. 
As for senior White House aides, most of them disagreed with the plan as well, but Rusk
says that Kennedy went with what the CIA had to say. As for himself, he said that he . .
. did not serve President Kennedy very well . . . and that he should have voiced his
opposition louder. He concluded that . . . I should have made my opposition clear in the
meetings themselves because he [Kennedy] was under pressure from those who wanted to
proceed. When faced with biased information from the CIA and quiet advisors, it is no
wonder that the president decided to go ahead with the operation.
It is clear then that part of the failure of the operation was caused by a lack of
security and attention to detail on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
misinformation given to the president.
On the international scene, the Bay of Pigs invasion lead directly to increased tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the invasion messages were
exchanged between Kennedy and Khrushchev regarding the events in Cuba. Khrushchev accused
the Americans of being involved in the invasion and stated in one of his messages that
a,
. . . so-called small war can produce a chain reaction
in all parts of the world . . . we shall render the Cuban
people and their Government all necessary assistance in
beating back the armed attack on Cuba . . . .
Kennedy replied giving American views on democracy and the containment of communism, he
also warned against Soviet involvement in Cuba saying to Khrushchev,
. . . In the event of any military intervention by
outside force we will immediately honor our obligations
under the inter-American system to protect this
hemisphere against external aggression . . . .
Even though this crisis passed, it set the stage for the next major crisis over Soviet
nuclear missiles in Cuba and probably lead to the Soviets increasing their military
support for Castro. 
In the administration itself, the Bay of Pigs crisis lead to a few changes. Firstly,
someone had to take the blame for the affair and, as Director of Central Intelligence,
Allen Dulles was forced to resign and left CIA in November of 1961 Internally, the CIA
was never the same, although it continued with covert operations against Castro, it was
on a much reduced scale. The CIA also now came under the supervision of the president's
brother Bobby, the Attorney General. According to Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, the outcome of
the Bay of Pigs failure also made the White House suspicious of an operation that
everyone agreed to, made them less reluctant to question the experts, and made them play
devil's advocates when questioning them. In the end, the lessons learned from the Bay of
Pigs failure may have contributed to the successful handling of the Cuban missile crisis
that followed.
The long term ramifications of the Bay of Pigs invasion are a little harder to assess.
The ultimate indication of the invasions failure is that thirty-four years later Castro
is still in power. This not only indicates the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, but
American policy towards Cuba in general. The American policy, rather than undermining
Castro's support, has probably contributed to it. As with many wars, even a cold one, the
leader is able to rally his people around him against an aggressor.
When Castro came to power he instituted reforms to help the people and end corruption, no
longer receiving help from the Soviet Union things are beginning to change. He has opened
up the Cuban economy for some investment, mainly in telecommunications, oil exploration,
and joint ventures. In an attempt to stay in power, he is trying to adapt his country to
the new reality of the world. Rather than suppressing the educated elite, he is giving
them a place in guiding Cuba. The question is, will they eventually want more power and a
right to control Cuba's fate without Castro's guidance and support? If the collapse of
past regimes is any indication, they will eventually want more power.
When Castro came to power in 1959, the major opponents in America to him, as with
Guatemala, were the business interests who were losing out as a result of his polices.
The major pressure for the Americans to do something came, not only from the Cuban exiles
in Florida, but from those businesses. Today, the tables are turned and businesses are
loosing out because of the American embargo against Cuba. It is estimated that if the
embargo were lifted, $1 billion of business would be generated for US companies that
first year. Right now, 100 firms have gone to Cuba to talk about doing business there
after the embargo is lifted. Will American policy change toward Cuba because of pressure
from business interests and growing problems with refugees from Cuba? Given the reasons
why the United States got involved in Latin American politics in the first place, it is
very likely that their position will change if they can find a face saving way to do so.
American policy at this time though is still stuck in the cold war, the chairmen of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms said that,
. . . Whether Castro leaves Cuba in a vertical or
horizontal position is up to him and the Cuban people.
But he must and will leave Cuba . . . .
The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion was caused by
misinformation and mismanagement, the consequences of that was egg in the face for the
Americans and an increase in tension between the superpowers at the height of the cold
war. We will only have to wait and see if the Americans have really learned their lesson
and will not miss another opportunity to set things right in Cuba. 
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