FREE ESSAY ON ATOMIC BOMB

ATOMIC BOMB

Herbert Feis served as the Special Consultant to three Secretaries of War. This book was
his finale to a series on the governmental viewed history of World War II, one of these
receiving the Pulitzer Prize. Mr. Feis gives personal accounts in a strictly factual
description leaving out no information that the president and high officials discussed
within the walls of the White House. The information that is presented is referenced
countlessly throughout the book. His position in the government gave him the ability to
have direct knowledge from personal individuals, in the government at that time, who had
assessed the actions first hand. With these contacts his information is not presented as
secondary information. 
In early August 1945, two atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. These two bombs quickly yielded the surrender of Japan and the end of the
American involvement in World War II. By 1946, the two bombs caused the death of perhaps
as many as 240,000 Japanese citizens. The popular view that dominated the 1950s and 60s,
presented by President Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, was that the at the
dropping of the atomic bombs was a solely military action that avoided the loss of as
many as a million lives in the upcoming American invasion of the island of Kyushu. In the
1960s a second idea developed, put forth by a collaboration of historians, that claimed
the dropping of the bomb was a diplomatic maneuver aimed at gaining the upper hand in
relations with Russia. Twenty years after the bombing, Feis, with the advantage of
historical hindsight and the advantage of new evidence, developed a third view, free from
obscuring bias. First, he stated that the dropping of the bomb was born out of a number
of military, domestic, and diplomatic pressures and concerns. Secondly, many potentially
alternatives to dropping the bombs were not explored by Truman and other men in power.
Lastly, because these alternatives were never explored, it can only be pondered over
whether or not Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs was a savior of lives, and it
may never be known if Truman's monumental decision was morally just one.
Japan had expansionist aims in Eastern Asia and in the Western Pacific. In July of 1940,
the United States placed an embargo on materials imported to Japan, including oil. The
majority of the American war effort was placed in Europe. Before the United States could
fully mobilize, most of South-East Asia had fallen to Japan, including the Philippines.
"The Japanese forces waged a stubborn, often suicidal battle."
Truman learned of the project, then called by its code name, S-1 (and later as the
Manhattan Project), from Secretary of War Stimson on 25 April 1945, only after becoming
President. Concurrent with the Manhattan project, both Japan and America were making
preparations for a final all-encompassing conflict. Both sides expected it would involve
an American invasion of mainland Japan. The Americans expanded conventional bombing and
tightened their increasingly successful naval blockade. The Japanese began the
stockpiling of aircraft, amassed a giant conscripted military force, and commenced the
creation of a civilian army, all who swore total allegiance to the emperor. This
awe-inspiring army included so-called 'Sherman Carpets,' children with dynamite strapped
to their bodies and trained to throw themselves under American tanks.
In the end, these final preparations were not effective. On, August 6, 1945, the American
B-29 bomber, named Enola Gay by the pilot Paul W. Tibbets, dropped the little boy uranium
atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. Three days later a second bomb, made of plutonium
and nicknamed fat boy, was dropped on the city of Nagasaki. On August 14, 1945, the
Japanese surrendered unconditionally and the war in Asia ended. 
Truman's monumental decision, to drop these bombs, was born out of a complex background
of decisions. Pressure to drop the bomb stemmed from three major categories: military,
domestic and diplomatic. 
The military pressures stemmed from discussion and meetings Truman had with Secretary of
War Stimson, Army Chief of Staff General Marshal, Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy,
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and others. On June 18, 1945, General Marshall and
Secretary of War Stimson convinced Truman to set an invasion of the island of Kyushu for
November 1945. Truman knew of the ferocious fighting currently taking place in the
Pacific, and naturally had a desire to minimize what he felt would inevitably be a long,
bloody struggle. The solution was the bomb. Even to the end, Truman implied that the bomb
was something for which the American people should be proud of, because it ultimately
saved more American lives.
The second major source of pressure on Truman and his advisors to drop the atomic bombs
came from domestic tensions and issues of reelection, combined with a collective American
feeling of hatred toward the Japanese race. As in most major military conflicts, there
was an effort to establish the Americans as morally superior to the Japanese. Truman was
no exception to this generalization, and on July 25, 1945, he wrote that the Japanese
people were, "savages, ruthless, merciless, and fanatic..." Furthermore, there was fear
amongst Truman's advisors that if they were to, "interpret the supreme war goal more
leniently for Japan than had been the case with Germany," they would, "leave an unwanted
impression, at home and abroad, of 'appeasement.' " Truman knew that if he backed down
from not dropping the bomb and did not remain firm on his stance with Japan the American
public might be outraged. Furthermore, if the bomb was not dropped, Truman feared that it
would prove extremely difficult in post war America to justify the two billion dollars
spent on the Manhattan Project.
The third major source of pressures on Truman to drop the bomb was diplomatic tensions
with Russia. Today, nothing about the dropping of the bombs is debated by historians more
than whether diplomatic tensions played a role in Truman's decision. Truman's
predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, followed a program of cooperation and good relations
with Russia, highlighted by the Lend-Lease program and the symbolic gestures of good
nature at the Yalta conference. Truman broke away from these good-natured relations and
sought to follow a new hard-line policy. While preparing for his first meeting with a
Russian official as President of the United States, Truman exclaimed that if the Russians
did not wish to be cooperative, they could go to hell. During his meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister Molotov, Truman told Molotov that the American interpretation [about the
conflict over Poland] was the only one possible. Furthermore, as the meeting came to a
close a flabbergasted Molotov responded, I have never been talked to like that in my
life. Collectively, these quotes leave little doubt that Truman embraced a new policy of
strict bluntness and a willingness to play hardball with the Russians.
While it is fairly clear that Truman embraced a new hard-line policy it is highly
controversial whether Truman took this policy one step farther. The revisionist historian
Alperovitz claims that Truman made a conscious effort to postpone the Potsdam meeting
until the atomic bomb could be tested, which he calls the strategy of a delayed showdown.
In this way, Truman would be able to intimidate the Russians and gain the political upper
hand, or as Secretary of State Byrnes told Truman the bomb could, put us in a position to
dictate our own terms at the end of the war. On 16 May 1945 Stimson told President Truman
that, We shall probably hold more cards in our hands later than now, and supposedly urged
him to adopt the policy of delay. Although Alperovitz himself admits that many of the
details are missing from Truman's meetings with his advisors, it nonetheless becomes
extremely difficult to believe Truman and Stimson's claim that the only reason the bomb
was dropped was for military reasons. 
There exists evidence in Truman's diaries and letters to his wife that seems to
contradict Alperovitz's revisionist theory of American diplomacy concerned with using the
bomb to intimidate the Russians. The first entry of note is from 7 June 1945, slightly
more than a month before the inception of the Potsdam Conference. On that day Truman
wrote: I'm not afraid of Russia. They've always been our friends and I can't see any
reason why they shouldn't always be. This feeling expressed by Truman of what seems like
sincere desire for a friendship is reinforced in Truman's gratitude towards Harry
Hopkins, whom he sent to meet with Joseph Stalin and set the stage for the upcoming
Potsdam Conference, and was greatly pleased about the good progress Hopkins made. In a
telegram to Truman on 12 May 1945 Winston Churchill expressed his fear and concerns that
the Allies, his country included, were withdrawing troops out of Europe, and asked,
Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia? Feis states that, "If, as Alperovitz maintains,
Truman was seeking a showdown with Russia would he not have responded to Churchill's
fears and ordered America's troops to stay in Eastern Europe? That way when the delayed
showdown did occur, he would still have military leverage in Europe." 
Instead Truman continued to withdraw his American troops from Eastern Europe. Later
Truman explained his reasoning: We were 150 miles east of the border of the occupation
zone line agreed to at Yalta. I felt that agreements made in the war to keep Russia
fighting should be kept and I kept them to the letter. In these statements, Feis saw a
sincere desire not to have a confrontation with Russia, or to intimidate them, but rather
a real desire to cooperate with them. In a letter to his wife on 18 July Truman told her
that, a start has been made and I've gotten what I came for--Stalin goes to war August 15
with no strings on it. There is no antagonism in these words, only pleasure over Stalin's
entrance. Nevertheless, there is one single, yet extremely important, diary entry which
seems to support the Alperovitz theory. In his diary on 17 July, the first day of the
Potsdam Conference, Truman recorded that, Most of the big points are settled. [Stalin
will] be in the Jap war on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about. Those last six
words are of the utmost importance, for they strongly suggest that Truman desired not to
receive help from the Russians, but instead to finish the war before Russian aid came
into being. Perhaps, as Alperovitz maintains, there may well have been a desire on
Truman's part to drop the bomb to gain an upper hand against Russia. 
In hindsight it appears as if there existed five major alternatives to the dropping of
the atomic bombs: a non-combat demonstration, a modification of the demand for
unconditional surrender, a pursuit of Japanese peace feelers, awaiting Soviet entry into
the war and lastly continuing conventional warfare--aerial bombing of cities and naval
blockade. Nevertheless, the first two of these are arguably the most realistic, and
therefore my discussion will be limited to the first two only. 
A non-combat demonstration would have entailed either dropping the bomb in a desolate
area with international observers or the dropping of the bomb on an unpopulated area of
Japan. This alternative was brought up twice, once on 31 May 1945 at the Interim
Committee Lunch and again in the Frank Committee report on 11 June 1945. The
recommendation by the Scientific Panel (presided over by the four principal physicists
involved in the Manhattan Project--Fermi, Lawrence, Compton and Oppenheimer) was to use
the bomb only in direct military use. This recommendation was collectively embraced by
Stimson, Truman, Byrnes and others because they feared that the bomb might turn out to be
a dud and thus prove counterproductive toward intimidating the Japanese, and also because
there was a severe limit to the materials on hand; as Stimson later wrote we had no bombs
to waste. Thus this alternative was not pursued, for the logistical obstacles were
thought to be difficult to overcome, and Allied military and political advisors were not
sure the observers would be allowed to report the demonstration to the Japanese Emperor
accurately. 
The second alternative to dropping the bomb would have been to modify the American demand
for the unconditional surrender so as to guarantee the continuance of the Japanese
emperor. It was believed by many American officials that this was the single issue
restraining the peace factions in Japan. After consulting with Joseph Grew and Harry
Hopkins, who both believed that Japan was already on the verge of defeat, Admiral Leahy
recommenced to Truman on 18 June 1945 that the demand for unconditional surrender be
modified. Truman commented that he would think about it, but voiced concern over public
opinion on this matter. Secretary of Stimson concurred, and in his 2 July 1945 memorandum
to Truman he wrote that he advised adding the clause that while the United States
demanded a peacefully inclined government, they would not exclude a constitutional
monarchy under [Japan's] present dynasty. In the end Truman did not accept this
recommendation, and the Potsdam Deceleration was released without any mention of the
Japanese emperor. Truman made this decision because he feared that such a modification
might embolden the Japanese to fight on for better terms. Ironically, when Japan's
surrender was accepted on 14 August, the emperor was allowed to remain in power. Thus,
this alternative to dropping the bomb was eventually embraced, but only after the bombs
were dropped, when it was no longer an alternative. 
Since these alternatives were not explored by Truman and his officials, Feis thought that
it could never be known if the atomic bombs were indeed a savior of lives. Still, Feis
stated that it was still possible to consider hypothetical situations. Feis wanted us to
assume that Truman explored the two major alternatives above, and perhaps the three
others as well. The first possibility is that the alternatives might have been successful
before 1 November 1945. In this case the bombs were not savior of lives, but rather
robbed Japan of as many as 240,000 innocent citizens. The second possibility is that the
alternatives would have failed, and the November invasion would have proceeded as
planned. To decide if the bomb would have been a savior of lives had the alternative
failed, Feis could only guess how many Americans and Japanese would have died in the
November invasion. Truman, Stimson wanted the American public to believe that the
invasion would have cost America one million casualties, but there was no evidence
available to support this claim. In a meeting on 18 June the Joint War Plans Committee
gave Truman projected death rates ranging from a low of 31,000 to a high of 50,000, and a
projected causality rate (deaths, injuries and missing) of 132,500. During the fighting
in the Pacific, from 1 March 1944 to 1 May 1945, the Japanese were killed at a ratio of
22 to 1. Thus, Feis used an estimate of 40,00 Americans that would die, it was determined
that there would be 880,000 Japanese deaths--for a combined total of 920,000 deaths.
Although death rates for Hiroshima and Nagasaki vary widely, none were even half this
high. Thus it was conclude that if an invasion of Kyushu had been necessary, and the
Japanese were killed at a rate comparable to previous fighting, then the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki actually saved lives. 
The decision to drop atomic bombs of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is one of the
most written about contemporary historical topics. Well over fifty major,
fully-researched and unique books are accessible to the public on this fascinating topic,
and perhaps as many as three hundred historical journals have been written as well.
Still, the majority of these articles are polarized--either the dropping of the bombs was
an immoral diplomatic maneuver or a glorious military action. To anyone with a sincere
desire for objectivity, a moderated view seems most reasonable, recognizing that it was a
combination of military, diplomatic and domestic issues that led to Truman's decision. In
addition, instead of passionately declaring the bomb to have cost innocent lives, or
declaring blankly that it was without doubt a savior of lives, it seems most reasonable
to conclude that we simply can not tell. Furthermore, Truman became President only weeks
before making his monumental decision; he seems to have dropped the bomb simply because
he never considered not dropping the bomb. Together with his advisors, Truman never
thought to rethink the basic principals established under the Manhattan Project's
inception under Roosevelt, and therefore dropped the bomb because they believed in their
heart it was the right thing to do, and never reconsidered